Slowly but surely, the Russian government is finding reasons\nto impose even more restrictions on the free and open internet. Tutanota, a\nsecure email service based in Germany, is the latest privacy-oriented email\nprovider to find itself blocked by Russian internet censors. This,\nunfortunately, should not come as a surprise to anyone who has been following\nthe latest events regarding the Russian government\u2019s relationship to the global\ninternet. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
When the\nBlocks Started<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia began blocking private email services like Protonmail\nunder the guise that false terroristic threats were being sent to the Russian\ngovernment from users utilizing these services. At first, the Russian\ngovernments blanket statement was that its vendetta was not with the email\nprovider, but with the individuals abusing it and wasting their time and\nresources. <\/p>\n\n\n\n On the surface, it almost seemed justified. When the blocks\nwere presented as a way to contain potential acts of terror and prevent the\nwaste of government resources, it seemed to be a controversial solution to a\nproblem that genuinely needed one. It no longer appeared that way when other\nprivate email services, such as Tutanota, came under fire. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Why\nSecure Mail Services are Really Being Blocked<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russian government demands open access and easy entry to\nany third party\u2019s services. Secure services like Tutanota cannot provide that\naccess \u2013 it defeats the entire point of their platform. You cannot claim to\nprovide a genuinely private service if you\u2019ve handed the government the keys to\nmonitor the operation. Tutanota, like most reliable privacy service providers,\nwould never comply with such requests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This puts them at a standstill with the Russian government.\nIf services can\u2019t comply, they can\u2019t exist. They\u2019ll get the ax just like\nTutanota did. Tutanota\u2019s founder, Matthias Pfau, expressed his outrage at the\nblock. He has expressed in no uncertain terms that he condemns the censorship\nby the Russian government and calls to attention that Russia is not the only\ncountry to make a similar move. In 2019, the Egyptian government also blocked\nTutanota\u2019s domain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n RuNet and\nWhat It Means<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia is making a concerted effort to eliminate as much of\nthe free and open internet as possible. The Russian government mandated that\nsurveillance and control equipment be used by all internet service providers.\nThey\u2019ve also created the structure for a solely Russian intranet, where the government\nwould have the ultimate authority to control and monitor everyone\u2019s use of the\nweb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Secure email services will continue to be blocked, as will\nall other privacy oriented apps, services, and websites. Russian citizens are\nlikely to be using the internet to figure out necessary workarounds before\nRuNet becomes Russia\u2019s sole internet, and the government is making moves akin\nto pre-emptive damage control. <\/p>\n\n\n\n RuNet is being tested on a regular basis, but does not\nappear to be fully ready to roll out. It would be wise for Russian citizens who\nvalue their privacy to start implementing sustainable workarounds that will\nallow them to easily rebound from RuNet becoming an unwanted fixture in their\nlives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What to\nDo About It<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In most countries with intranet systems and heavy\ncensorship, including countries in which VPN use is explicitly or technically\nillegal, there are some workarounds. Governments can detect most VPN use, as\nshielded traffic comes with a header in its packet that denotes it is being\nprotected by a VPN. Stealth VPNs will hide this information, a process also\nknown as VPN obfuscation. Stealth VPNs make traffic appear to be normal HTTPS\ntraffic, which is exactly what the overwhelming majority of all internet\ntraffic amounts to. <\/p>\n\n\n\n